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Benno Schmidt, president of Yale University, is greatly troubled by the
nominations of William Rehnquist as Chief Justice and Antonin Scalia as Justice of
the Supreme Court.' They are, he states, "plainly designed to produce seismic
change in the content of our constitutional law and in the role of the Supreme Court
in our political system." He portends that Rehnquist may lead the Court away from
"the activist, constitutional premises and methods of the Warren Court," and
considers that "these appointments constitute a greater challenge to the received
tradition of constitutional law than any we have seen for a half century." This
"received tradition," he explains, was itself "set in motion by the Constitutional
Revolution of 1938," and was marked by a retreat "from judicial activism in
economic regulation" and shift to "activism for protection of minority rights and
civil liberties."
No "revolution" and its "innovations" is sacrosanct; each generation is free to
make its own revolution or counter-revolution. Why should Rehnquist and Scalia feel
bound by the dead hand of Earl Warren, who discarded long-standing precedents in
droves, so many that Professor Phillip Kurland justly remarked, "The list of opinions
destroyed by the Warren Court reads like a table of contents from an old
constitutional law casebook.'2 The "received tradition" theretofore was to rely on
the Founders' design, and it is therefore unjust to brand Rehnquist's preference for
their original intention as a "reactionary constitutional vision." Justices, after all, are
sworn to support the Constitution, not Warren's "revolution." "However the Court
may interpret the provisions of the Constitution," said Charles Warren, "it is still the
Constitution which is the law, not the decisions of the Court. "3 Justices as diverse as
Chief Justice Burger, Justice Douglas and Justice Frankfurter have claimed the right
to look at the Constitution for themselves. 4 Certainly Justice Rehnquist is not out of
touch with the "temper of the times" with respect to school prayer, death penalties
and the like. Like Schmidt, I am not an anti-abortionist nor advocate of prayer in the
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schools; but unlike him I do not mistake my predilections for constitutional
imperatives.
Schmidt's "activist premises" are short-hand for judicial importation of
mandates not to be found in the Constitution or its history. It is widely agreed that
most of the "human rights" fashioned by the modem Court are without warrant in
the Constitution-they are judicial constructs pure and simple." 5 So the Court
acknowledged in the "sodomy" case. 6 There Justice White observed that despite the
procedural implication of the due process language, the Court has read substantive
restrictions into due process and has recognized "rights that have little or no textual
support in the constitutional language, ' 7 and indeed are precluded by the history of
the Constitution. The Court refused "to discover new fundamental rights imbedded
in the Due Process Clause," explaining that "[t]he Court is most vulnerable and
comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law
having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution. "8
"Otherwise," White stated, "the Judiciary necessarily takes to itself further
authority to govern the country without express constitutional authority.'9
Simply stated, the judicial creation of such "individual rights" deprives the
people and the states of the right to self-government guaranteed to them by the tenth
amendment. In the case of death penalties, for example, which the lion's share of the
public demands, the Court would cram its morals down the throats of the people, in
reliance on the "cruel and unusual punishments" clause-a clause clearly not
intended to apply to death penalties, for the accompanying fifth amendment
recognizes that life may be taken after a due process trial.' 0
There are, to be sure, academicians like Rober Cover of Yale who thrust aside
"the self-evident meaning of the Constitution" in favor of an "ideology" which
"we" allegedly have entrusted the Court with the task of framing.'' Where,
Rehnquist and Scalia would be justified in asking, did "we the people" make such
a grant?
In praise of the Warren Court, Schmidt notes that its "valiant efforts to exorcise
the constitutional demon of racism required the Court to upset long-held patterns of
deference to state courts and state legislatures." Worse, the Court even upset the
framers' determination to leave segregation to the states. The history of the fourteenth
amendment makes very plain that except for certain purposes the framers meant to
preserve state control over local, internal matters.' 2 And academicians increasingly
agree that the framers meant to leave segregation untouched, to be controlled by the
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states.' 3 No more than Schmidt am I a devotee of racism; but for me the integrity of
the Constitution has ever been paramount. I would not manipulate the Constitution to
effectuate my social aspirations. With George Washington, I believe that there should
be "no change by usurpation [read judicial amendment]; for though this, in one
instance, may be the instrument of good, it is the customary weapon by which free
governments may be destroyed. 14 And as Hamilton emphasized, "every breach of the
fundamental laws, though dictated by necessity ... forms a precedent for other
breaches where the same plea of necessity does not exist at all."' 15 Schmidt himself
notices that "activism in pursuit of racial equality easily and naturally led to activism
in pursuit of other constitutional ends."
To the extent that Rehnquist is "at odds with virtually all major aspects of the
Warren Court's constitutional innovations," he is merely reverting to the design of
the Founders. Justices as dissimilar as Douglas and Frankfurter refused to be bound
by the view of their predecessors and insisted on looking to the Constitution for
themselves.' 6 What Schmidt considers to be "reaction in constitutional fundamen-
tals" is in truth a return to the "fundamentals" of the Founders.
What did the Founders intend the "role" of the Court to be? From Francis
Bacon, Justice James Wilson, next to Madison as architect of the Constitution, and
through repeated affirmations of the Court, it has been underlined that the role of the
Court is to interpret, not to make law.' 7 Chief Justice Marshall, cognizant of the
separation of powers, declared that "[t]he difference between the departments
undoubtedly is,-that the legislature makes, the executive executes, and the judiciary
construes the law . "... I8 Judicial law-making subverts federalism, and under
federalism the states were to be shielded from federal exercise of ungranted power,
as the tenth amendment hammered home. When the Court grafts new requirements
on to the Constitution, it is making the most fundamental law in violation of the
separation of powers, of the amendment power, and often of states' rights.
Insofar as Rehnquist and Scalia would defer to the states, they can stand on the
authority of the Founders. Madison wrote that "[iln the new government, as in the
old, the general powers are limited. [Tihe States, in all unenumerated cases, are left in
the enjoyment of their sovereign and independent jurisdicton."' 9 Chief Justice
Marshall referred to "that immense mass of legislation, which embraces everything
within the territory of a State, not surrendered to the general government.'20 In
Federalist No. 39, Madison assured the ratifiers that the federal jurisdiction "extends
to certain enumerated objects only, and leaves to the .. . States a residuary and
inviolable sovereignty over all other objects."'21 Given that the various "rights"
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constructed by the Court in recent years have no constitutional warrant, Rehnquist
and Scalia may safely be guided by the original intention to safeguard state control
of local matters.
By no means am I confident that the Reagan appointees will adhere to the
Founders' design whatever the political cost. But I am content to accept as a starting
point a return to first principles that coincide with their political views, secure in the
knowledge that in spelling out the constitutional basis for honoring the original
intention, they cannot fail to leave an impression that will influence future decisions.
